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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44821
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) CUSTER COUNTY NO. CR 2016-22
v. )
)
COLE JASON WALTERS, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cole Walters contends the district court abused its discretion by executing his sentences,
as opposed to suspending them, or even retaining jurisdiction.  A sufficient consideration of the
mitigating factors reveals that those more lenient options, which would have actually promoted
the  goal  of  rehabilitation,  would  better  serve  all  the  goals  of  sentencing.   As  such,  this  Court
should remand this case for an order placing Mr. Walters on probation.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Walters pled guilty to one count of delivering
methamphetamine on one date and one count of possessing methamphetamine on a different
2date.  (See R., pp.303, 308-09.)  As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.1  (R., p.303.)2  Mr. Walters was 49 years old at
the time, and the instant offense constituted his second felony conviction.3  (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.1, 7.)  Ultimately, the PSI author recommended the
district court retain jurisdiction over the case, and the GAIN-I recommended Mr. Walters
participate in intensive outpatient treatment to address his substance abuse issues.  (PSI, pp.14,
35.)
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel provided several letters of support for
Mr. Walters.  (Tr., p.38, L.24 - p.39, L.3; see Exhibits PDF, pp.7-17.)4  Defense counsel noted
1 Mr. Walter’s motion to suppress was based on the fact that, when the officers sought a search
warrant for Mr. Walter’s home, they did not inform the magistrate that the confidential informant
(CI) who had performed the alleged controlled buy in this case was facing charges for forgery,
falsifying records, and preparing false evidence, nor did they inform the magistrate that they had
lost sight of the CI for several minutes after the alleged buy but before debriefing her.
(R., pp.61-62.)  The district court agreed that the officer had not presented that information to the
magistrate, but there was no evidence showing that omission was knowing or reckless, and that,
even with the omitted information, the “magistrate likely would have found that there was a
reasonable suspicion that  drugs  were  located  at  the  residence  named  on  the  affidavit.”
(R., pp.208-10 (emphasis added).)
2 In addition to waiving the right to challenge the denial of the motion to suppress, the plea
agreement also purports to waive Mr. Walters’ ability to file a petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., p.303.)  However, such waivers are, at a minimum, disfavored. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ABA Resolution 113E (2013) (available at www.americanbar.org) (opposing
“plea or sentencing agreements that waive a criminal defendant's post-conviction claims
addressing ineffective assistance of counsel . . . unless based on past instances of such conduct
that  are  specifically  identified  in  the  plea  or  sentencing  agreement  or  transcript  of  the
proceedings”); National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, NACDL Ethics Advisory
Committee, Formal Opinion 12-02 (2012) (available at www.nacdl.org) (concluding it is
unethical for a criminal defense lawyer participate in plea agreements calling for waivers of
defendants’ rights to collaterally attack convictions, in part, because waivers of ineffective
assistance claims create inherent conflicts of interest for defense lawyers).  At most, they are
void. See, e.g., Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065, 1067-68 (Ind. 1991).
3 While there were several other charges on Mr. Walters’ record, the majority had either
been dismissed or the prosecutor had decided not to pursue them.  (Tr., p.33, Ls.3-10; see PSI,
pp.4-7.)
4 All citations to “Tr.” refer to the volume entitled “44821-Walters Transcripts.pdf.”
3that Mr. Walters and his wife (who was his co-defendant in this case) had been paying for
urinalysis tests during the pendency of their cases, which showed they were remaining sober.
(Tr., p.40, Ls.13-18.)  Additionally, defense counsel noted that, if Mr. Walters were incarcerated,
they would lose his social security disability income.5  (Tr., p.42, Ls.1-4.)  Mr. Walters explained
he and his wife depended on that income to cover their bills, including rent.  (Tr., p.52,
Ls.10-17.)  However, he also explained he understood there would be consequences and he
accepted responsibility for his actions in this case.  (Tr., p.52, Ls.19-20)  Based on all these
factors, defense counsel recommended the district court suspend Mr. Walters’ sentence for a
period of probation.  (Tr., p.40, Ls.8-10; see also Tr., p.58, Ls.8-10 (defense counsel asking if the
district court was going to retain jurisdiction after it pronounced Mr. Walters’ sentences).)
The district court rejected that recommendation, as well as the PSI’s recommendation to
retain jurisdiction.  Rather, it imposed and executed a unified sentence of ten years, with four
years fixed, on the delivery charge and a concurrent unified sentence of six years, with two years
fixed, on the possession charge.6  (Tr., p.56, Ls.11-17, p.58, Ls.8-10.)  However, it noted that it
had initially planned on imposing more substantial sentences, but it tempered that decision based
on the information presented at the sentencing hearing.  (Tr., p.56, Ls.6-9.)  Mr. Walters filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.320, 325.)
5 Mr. Walters receives disability due to the symptoms associated with his being born with
clubbed feet and the experimental surgery performed to try and correct that condition.  (See, e.g.,
PSI, p.10.)
6 The district  court  subsequently reduced the term of the delivery sentence to a unified term of
six years, with three years fixed, pursuant to I.C.R. 35.  (R., pp.337-38.)  As such, Mr. Walters’
current aggregate sentence is for a term of six years, with three years fixed.
4ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by not suspending Mr. Walters’ sentences at the
initial sentencing hearing.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Suspending Mr. Walters’ Sentences At The
Initial Sentencing Hearing
The decision of whether to suspend a sentence when it is imposed is one that is within
the district court’s discretion. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278
(Ct. App. 2002).  In order to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing
decision, the defendant must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997); see
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (articulating the standard for reviewing whether the
district court abused its discretion).  The protection of society is the primary objective the court
should consider when it imposes sentences. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also indicated that rehabilitation is the first means the
district court should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240
(1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
Notably,  Mr.  Walters  had  demonstrated  some  ability  to  be  successful  on  release,  as  he
and his wife (who had already received probation in relation to this matter) had been taking
urinalysis tests at their own expense which showed Mr. Walters had remained sober in the year
his case was pending.  (Tr., p.36, Ls.12-17, p.40, Ls.13-18.)  Furthermore, he showed he had
taken the first steps toward rehabilitation by expressing remorse and accepting responsibility for
his actions.  (Tr., p.50, Ls.5-6, p.52, Ls.19-20.)  Additionally, several family members and
5friends wrote letters of support, and having a support network in place also increases the
potential for successful rehabilitation.  (Tr., p.38, L.24 - p.39, L.3; see Exhibits PDF, pp.7-17.)
A sufficient consideration of these factors demonstrates that Mr. Walters, like his wife,
could be successful in continuing his rehabilitation in the community.  That is, in fact, what the
GAIN-I evaluation recommended when it recommended intensive outpatient treatment.  (PSI,
p.35.)  As a result, the district court’s decision to execute Mr. Walters’ sentence rather than
suspending it for a period of probation (or, at least, retaining jurisdiction as recommended by the
author of the PSI (see PSI, p.14)) constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Walters respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order executing his sentences
and remand this case for an order placing him on probation.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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